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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

READY MIX CONCRETE
COl·IPANY, a corporation,

WESTERN

Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs
RICHARD RODRIGUEZ, JEANE C.
LeCHEMINANT and

Case No. 14811

Defendants,
EDGAR KELLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE KIIW OF CASE
This is an action to foreclose a materialman's lien and for
failure to post a bond as required by Title 14-2-1 et. seq. of
.the Utah Code Annotated.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court without a jury.

The District

Court, Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Sr., found the issues in favor of
plaintiff-respondent and awarded judgment for the sum of $558.21,
attorney's fees of $300.00, costs of Court of $33.10 and a decree
of foreclosure against the appellant.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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(1)

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Affirmance of the judgment and decree of the Lower Court.
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES AND EXPLANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS
Western Ready Mix Concrete Company, the plaintiff and respondent,
will hereinafter be referred to as the plaintiff, or where appropriate, by name.

Mr. Edgar Kelley, the defendant and appellant,

will hereinafter be referred to as the defendant, or where appropri·
ate, by his name.

Mr. Rodriguez, the contractor, will hereinafter

be referred to as contractor, or where appropriate, by his name.
"R" refers to a page reference in the record of the case.
Exhibits are noted by number with "P" referring to plaintiff and
"D" referring to defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, Western Ready Mix, brought an action to foreclose
a materialman' s lien and under the provisions of Title 14-2-1 of the

1

i

Utah Code Annotated against the defendant, Edgar Kelley.

Mr. Kelley,

as the owner of the real property located at 941 South Fourth East,
Salt Lake City, Utah, entered into a written contract for the construction of improvements on said property with Richard J. Rodriguez,'
on or about December 17, 1974.

(R 80-82, Exhibit 1-P).

Kelley

paid Rodriguez a total of $3,408.00 for labor and materials under
the contract with Rodriguez.

(R 109, Exhibit 4-D).

Rodriguez

purchased from plaintiff cement which was used in construction of
improvements on the re~l property owned by Mr. Kelley.
Exhibit 2-P).

(R

ss-sG,

A bond was not posted by either Mr. Kelley or Mr.

(2)
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(R 83, 85).

Rodriguez.

Rodriguez did not pay plaintiff for the

cement and plaintiff filed a notice of lien against the property of
Mr. Kelley for the unpaid concrete.

(R 95, Exhibit 3-P).

Kelley made no payments to Western Ready Mix.

(R 83).

Mr.

When Mr.

Kelley made payments to Mr. Rodriguez, he did not designate the
items of account to which the payment was to be applied.
110).

(R 109-

Mr. Rodriguez claimed he had purchased cement prior to the

deliveries of January 9, 1975, and he was on a C.O.D. basis.
(R 111).

That he paid $600.00 to Mr. Van Roosendaal

of plaintiff

corporation on or before January 9th or 10th, 1975, or maybe before
that.

(R 111-112).

Plaintiff's Exhibit 2-P showed Mr. Rodriguez

was not on a C.O.D. basis, but a charge basis on January 10, 1975.
The claimed payment by Mr. Rodriguez was shown to have been made
on February 2, 197 5.

(R 107).

There was no payment to Mr. Rodriguez

by Mr. Kelley on or about February 1, 1975 and the last payment was
February 19, 197 5.

(R 109-110, Exhibit 4-D).

Mr. Rodriguez owed

plaintiff the sum of $2,247.21 for concrete purchased on account
for other jobs as well as the Kelley job, prior to, during and after
the Kelley job.

(R 89 ,115).

Plaintiff takes issue with the statement of defendant in his
brief at page 6 that Mr. Woodbury did not explain why the cement
delivered of January 9th and 10th were not marked either C.O.D.
or charge.

Mr. Woodbury stated that the fact some of the invoices

were not marked charge was due to the mechanical fault of the
dispatcher.

!

(R 105).

(3)
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ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT AS THE TRIER OF
FACT WAS CORRECT IN LAW AND FACT
The main trust of defendant's appeal is that the Trial Court
rejected defendant's contention that Section 58-23-14.5 of the
Utah Code Annotated 1953 applied to the facts and evidence of
this case.

The cited section provides:

"Any owner or contractor in making any payment to a
materialman, contractor or sub-contractor with whom
he has a running account, or with whom he has more
than one contract, or to whom he is otherwise indebted,
shall designate the contract under which the payment is
made or the items of account to which it is to be
applied."
"When a payment for materials or labor is made to a
sub-contractor, or materialman, such sub-contractor
or materialman shall demand of the person making such
payment a designation of the account and the items of
account to which such payment is to apply.
In any case
where a lien is claimed for materials furnished, or
labor performed by a sub-contractor or materialman,
it shall be a defense to such claim that a payment
made, by the owner to the contractor for such materials
has been so designated and paid over to such subcontractor or materialman, and that when such payment
was received by such sub-contractor or materialman
he did not demand a designation of the account and of
the items of account to which such payment was applied."
(Emphasis Added) .
The defendant, Mr. Kelley, made no payments to Western Ready Mix.
(R 83).

At the time Mr. Kelley made payments to Mr. Rodriguez,

the contractor, he did not designate the items of account to which
it was to be applied, and that at no time when he made payments
to Mr. Rodriguez did he designate for what the payments were made,
whether it was for materials or labor, as required by the provisions

(4)
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of the above statute.

(R 109-110).

Whether or not there has been

a designation by the contractor, Mr. Rodriguez, was questionable
in the mind of the Court, as evidenced by the Court's memorandum
decision, the findings of fact and conclusions of law.
38-41).

(R

32-33,

The Lower Court, in its memorandum decision, found and

concluded:
"2. That defendant's motion to dismiss, which was
again renewed at the conclusion of defendant's
defense, should be denied upon the grounds and for
the reasons that the Court is of the opinion that the
section above referred to does not relate to the
situation now before the Court, and furthermore that
the testimony of Rodriguez offered by the defendants
in connection with their defense does not jibe with
the exhibits introduced and received by the Court,
particularly those of the plaintiff, which records
are kept in the usual course of business." It is clear that the Lower Court found that the testimony of Mr.
Rodriguez as to the claimed designated payment to the plaintiff
on the Kelley job was questionable in light of the other
evidence presented.

The Lower Court, as the trier of fact, has

the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during the
time that they testify, and as to whether or not the testimony
given by the witness is sufficient to maintain the burden of proof
required by law to sustain a defense or proposition of the party
asserting the same.
In this case, the defendant had the burden of producing evidence
which would prove the defense asserted, and to persuade the trier
Of fact that his evidence is more credible or entitled to the

greater weight.

In the case of Keesling v. Basamakis, 539 P. 2d

l043, this Court stated:

(5)
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"A proponent of a proposition has the burden of producing evidence which proves or tends to prove the
proposition asserted and to persuade the trier of
fact that his evidence is more credible or entitled
to the greater weight."
"Where proponent of a proposition has the burden of
persuading the trier of fact by a preponderance of
the evidence, he carries that burden through out
the trial and, having adduced sufficient evidence
to show existence of the proposition, and having
thus met his burden of production, he nevertheless
suffers the risk or nonpersuasion or disbelief."
(Emphasis Added).
Conceding for the sake of argument only that defendant produced
evidence which tended to prove the defense asserted, it is clear
from the record that defendant failed in his burden of persuasion
where considerable conflict existed in the evidence presented.
Where the Lower Court, as the trier of fact, was in a much better
position to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and their testimonies, and determine the weight to be given to the evidence
presented, this Court is under duty to assume that the Trial Judge
believed those aspects of the evidence which support his findings.
Cornia v. Cornia, 546 P. 2d 890.

It is well established in our law,

that on appeal, evidence and all inferences which can reasonably
be drawn therefrom, must be viewed in light favorable to findings
made and conclusions drawn by the Trial Court.

Cutler v. Bowen,

543 P. 2d 1349; Wagstaff v. Remco, Inc. , 540 P. 2d 931; Tates, Inc.
v. Little America Refinery Company, 535 P.2d 1228.
Defendant had not only the burden of proof as to the defense
claimed, but the burden of persuasion.

It is clear from the

memorandum decision of the Court and the findings of the court

(6)
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that defendant failed in this burden.

The testimony of the case,

and the evidence presented, clearly support the Trial Court in its
determination that Section 58-23-14.5 is not applicable in this
case under the evidence presented, and the decision of the Lower
court must be affirmed.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT
ON ITS CLAIM UNDER SECTION 14-2-2 U.C.A. 1953
Assuming, for the sake of argument only, that the Lower Court
had found that Section 58-23-14.5 applied to this case under the
facts and evidence presented, and was a defense to the lien action
of plaintiff, plaintiff would have been entitled to a judgment
against defendant on its claim under Section 14-2-2 Utah Code
Annotated 1953.

Section 14-2-2 provides:

"Any person subject to the provisions of this
chapter, who shall fail to obtain such good and
sufficient bond, or to exhibit the same, as
herein required, shall be personally liable to
all persons who have furnished materials or performed labor under the contract for the reasonable
value of such materials furnished or labor performed, ***."
(Emphasis Added).

Mr. Kelley was asked specifically whether or not he had requested
a bond be posted by Mr. Rodriguez of any type.

The testimony of

Mr. Kelley was as follows:
"(R 83). Q When you commenced the construction of
these improvements did you request a bond be posted
by Mr. Rodriguez of any type?
A I discussed this with Richard at the
time and he said that, "If you require a bond it
will cost you more money." And I was anxious to
save the money. Again I will just have to plead
ignorance as far as this is concerned, which I know
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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(7)

is no excuse apparently.
Q Did you post a bond, or did Mr. Rodriguez
post a bond?
A No.
Q Neither one, is that correct?
A No."
The testimony of Mr. Rodriguez as to the posting of a bond was as
follows:
"(R 85). Q I take it you did not post a performance
bond in connection with this contract?
A No, I didn't."
Mr. Rodriguez also testified that the concrete purchased by him was

used in the improvements on Mr. Kelley's property.
2-P).

(R

86, Exhibit

Mr. Rodriguez also testified that the amount of concrete

that was used on the Kelley job was approximately 30 or 40 yards,
and was for an amount in excess of $800.00.

(R

85).

A reading of Section 58-23-14.5 clearly indicates that it is
not applicable to a claim under Section 14-2-2.

In the case of

Roberts Investment Company v. Gibbons & Reed Concrete Products
Company, 22 U.2d 105, 449 P.2d 116, this Court held that the materialman was entitled to recover for materials furnished to the
contractor and used in constructing improvements on the property
·of the owner, even though the owner had obtained release of claims
from the materialman at the time he paid bills for materials used
by him, and the Court determined that the notice of lien sought
to be foreclosed in the action was deficient and no claim would
lie therefore.

Thus, had the Lower Court found in favor of defend·

ant on his motion to dismiss based upon the defense raised, it
would not have precluded plaintiff from recovering judgment against
(8)
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defendant Kelley on its claim under Section 14-2-2 U.C.A. 1953,
in that no bond was posted by either the defendant or the contractor as required by law.

There would not have been an award of

attorney's fees had the Court based its judgment upon this portion
of plaintiff's claim.
POINT III
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO DEFENDANT WOULD NOT
BE PROPER UNDER THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF
THIS CASE
Defendant claims that he is entitled to an award of attorney's
fees should he be successful on this appeal and cites his authority
therefore Section 38-1-18 U.C.A 1953, and the case of Palombi v.
D & C Builders,

22 U.2d 297, 452 P.2d 325.

At the time of trial, defendant failed to present any testimony
to the Court as to what would be a reasonable attorney's fee should
the Court find that defendant was the successful party under this
action.

It has been the law in the State of Utah for a consider-

able time that the award of a reasonable attorney's fee is a
question of fact to be determined by the Lower Court upon evidence
presented.

In the case of Hatch v. Sugarhouse Finance, 20 U.2d 156,

434 P.2d 758, this Court stated:

"Issues as to quantity and reasonable value of legal
services rendered by attorneys to defendant were
presented, precluding summary judgment for attorneys
seeking to recover for services rendered ***·"
In the case of Wallace v. Build, Inc., 16 U.2d 401, 402 P.2d 699,

the Court stated:

L

"Question as to what is reasonable attorney's fees in

(9)
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contested matter is not necessarily controlled by any
set formula, and what is reasonable depends on number
of factors, including amount in controversy, extent
of services rendered and other factors which Trial
Court is in advantaged position to judge."
Thus, it can be seen that the claim for attorney's fees on the part
of defendant, should defendant be successful on this appeal, would
not be proper under the present status and circumstances of this
I

.'

case.
CONCLUSION

The testimony and evidence presented in this case clearly support11
and sustains the Lower Court in its findings and conclusions of law
as set forth in its memorandum decision.

The Lower Court, as the

trier of fact, properly concluded that Section 58-23-14.5 of the
Utah Code Annotated did not apply to the facts and circumstances of
this case, and the judgment rendered was proper.

The decision of the

Lower Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
COTRO-MANES, WARR, FANKHAUSER

& BEASLEY

~dd~

_11'

E~. FKHAUSER

,

Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
430 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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